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ABSTRACT Statistical analysis is used throughout biomedical research and elsewhere to assess 
strength of evidence. We have previously argued that typical outcome statistics (including p-
values and maximum likelihood ratios) have poor measure-theoretic properties: they can 
erroneously indicate decreasing evidence as data supporting an hypothesis accumulate; and they 
are not amenable to calibration, necessary for meaningful comparison of evidence across 
different study designs, data types, and levels of analysis. We have also previously proposed that 
thermodynamic theory, which allowed for the first time derivation of an absolute measurement 
scale for temperature (T), could be used to derive an absolute scale for evidence (E). Here we 
present a novel thermodynamically-based framework in which measurement of E on an absolute 
scale, for which “one degree” always means the same thing, becomes possible for the first time. 
The new framework invites us to think about statistical analyses in terms of the flow of 
(evidential) information, placing this work in the context of a growing literature on connections 
among physics, information theory, and statistics.  
 
INTRODUCTION  
In previous work we have argued for the importance of rigorous methods for measuring 
statistical evidence in biomedical research and other arenas, and we have proposed using the 
mathematical foundations of thermodynamics as a template for achieving this end (Vieland 
2006; Vieland 2011; Vieland and Hodge 2011). Here we complete the first stage of development 
of a thermodynamically based methodological framework in which evidence becomes 
measurable on an absolute scale for the first time. 
By an absolute scale we mean one for which the unit of measurement means the same thing 
across the range of the measurement scale (just as an increase of one foot of length means the 
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same thing, up to given measurement precision, regardless of whether that one foot is added to 
one foot or to one hundred feet), and across disparate applications (just as one foot means the 
same thing whether measuring lengths of rope or lumber). It is worth pointing out from the 
outset that this understanding of “absolute” goes beyond requiring an absolute 0 point for the 
measurement scale, which is sometimes misunderstood as the basis on which the Kelvin 
thermometric scale is said to be absolute. (The term “absolute” is also used differently in 
representational measurement theory.) The Kelvin scale is clearly and by design absolute in the 
same sense in which we are using the term (Chang 2004).  
Perhaps the most intellectually challenging aspect of our measurement problem is simply 
articulating what is meant by means the same thing for evidence measures. For instance, many 
statisticians use the p-value to indicate the degree of evidence against a null hypothesis. But how 
would we go about establishing whether a change of, say, 0.001 means the same thing relative to 
a baseline p-value of 0.01 and relative to another baseline p-value of 0.0001? Other statisticians 
use the log likelihood ratio (LR) as a measure of evidence, but the same conundrum arises. Not 
only is it unclear whether a change in the log LR from 1 to 2 means the same thing as a change 
from 10 to 11, or perhaps from 10 to 20; it is moreover not even clear how we would go about 
investigating the matter. We lack a methodological framework in which asking for the meaning 
of means the same thing is a well-posed question. But surely measurement of any quantity, 
including evidence, requires at a minimum that the unit of measurement always does in fact 
mean the same thing. 
It is noteworthy that the abstract and obscure nature of this measurement quandary is directly 
parallel to that faced and overcome by Kelvin himself in the mid-19th century, a stroke of 
historical luck that we gladly exploit for our own purposes. We develop a methodological 
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framework in the context of which it becomes possible to articulate a definition of means the 
same thing in measuring statistical evidence, based on what is meant by this phrase in reference 
to degrees of temperature in thermodynamics. In essence our approach is extremely simple: we 
reinterpret fundamental thermodynamic quantities in terms of evidential rather than physical 
processes, then port the mathematical underpinnings of thermodynamics over to the evidential 
side en bloc. The quantity denoted by T in thermodynamics – temperature measured on the 
absolute scale – is in this framework translated as the evidence E, which is then intrinsically 
measured on the absolute scale, in exactly the same sense in which T is.  
Various connections have of course been previously made between thermodynamics and 
certain aspects of statistical inference; see, e.g., (Shannon 1948; Jaynes 1957; Cox 1961; 
Kullback 1968; Soofi 2000; Caticha 2003), primarily based on the power of one particular 
concept – entropy – in multiple settings. We view our own results as extensions of Jaynes’ 
research into connections among Shannon entropy, statistical mechanical entropy, 
thermodynamic entropy, and statistical inference. We wonder, however, why Jaynes himself 
never asked the following question: If crucial underlying quantities such as entropy tie statistical 
inference and thermodynamics together, and given the central role of temperature in 
thermodynamics, what then is the analogue of temperature on the inferential side? Our answer 
represents, as far as we know, the first proposal to interpret statistical evidence as the direct 
mathematical analogue of temperature, and moreover, of temperature as measured on the 
absolute scale. We	  focus	  in	  this	  paper	  on	  one	  very	  simple	  statistical	  model.	  Suppose	  we	  are	  interested	  in	  the	  evidence	  that	  a	  certain	  coin	  is	  either	  fair	  or	  biased	  towards	  landing	  tails.	  We	  perform	  one	  or	  more	  experiments,	  each	  time	  tossing	  the	  coin	  n	  times	  and	  observing	  the	  number	  of	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times	  x	  that	  the	  coin	  lands	  heads	  (where	  both	  n	  and	  x	  can	  vary	  across	  experiments).	  	  For	  a	  given	   experiment,	   the	  data	   (n,	   x)	   carry	   information	   about	   the	   coin,	  which	  we	   capture	  by	  graphing	   the	   likelihood	   ratio	   (LR)	   as	   a	   function	   of	   P(heads)	   =	   θ,	   fixing	   θ	   =	   ½	   in	   the	  denominator	   of	   the	   LR.	   	   Data	   from	   subsequent	   experiments	   change	   the	   LR	   graph,	   for	  instance,	   causing	   the	   height	   of	   the	   graph	   at	   its	   maximum	   to	   increase.	   We	   consider	   the	  evidence	  itself	  as	  a	  property	  of	  the	  graph,	  and	  seek	  to	  define	  this	  property	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  amenable	   to	   absolute	   measurement,	   while	   preserving	   our	   underlying	   feel	   for	   what	   we	  mean	  by	  evidence.	  Our	  starting	  point	   is	  what	  may	  at	   first	  appear	  as	  a	  relatively	  obscure	  analogy	  with	  the	  elementary	  heat	  engine	  of	   thermodynamics,	  more	  specifically,	  with	   the	  abstract	  model	  of	  the	  workings	  of	  a	  heat	  engine	  embodied	  in	  the	  Carnot	  cycle.	  The	  purpose	  of	  a	  heat	  engine	  is	  to	   convert	   heat	   into	  work,	   say,	   using	   the	   heat	   to	   raise	   a	   piston,	   and	   similarly	   we	  might	  describe	   the	   purpose	   of	   the	   coin-­‐tossing	   experiment	   to	   be	   the	   conversion	   of	   the	  information	  conveyed	  by	  new	  data	  into	  movement	  of	  the	  LR	  graph.	  But	  more	  importantly	  for	  our	  purposes,	  the	  Carnot	  cycle	  constituted	  the	  basis	  for	  rigorous	  understanding	  of	  the	  fundamental	  dynamics	  of	  thermal	  systems.	  We	  therefore	  consider	  what	  is	  to	  be	  gained	  by	  considering	   the	   statistical	   experiment	   as	   the	   analogue	   of	   the	   heat	   engine,	   in	   order	   to	  rigorously	   characterize	   the	   relationships	   among	   evidential	   analogues	   of	   heat,	   work,	   and	  temperature.	  Thus	  rather	  than	  begin	  by	  assuming	  any	  particular	  definition	  of	  E,	  instead,	  we	  adopt	  as	  our	  sole	  methodological	  constraint	  that	  our	  evidential	  model	  must	  adhere	  to	  the	  equations	   required	   to	   construct	   and	   analyze	   Carnot	   cycles.	   The	   resulting	   evidential	  dynamical	  framework	  will	  be	  justified	  insofar	  as	  it	  proves	  fruitful,	  even	  if	  it	  should	  remain	  difficult	   to	   relate	   the	   idealized	  workings	   of	   an	   engine	   to	   how	  we	   ordinarily	   think	   about	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statistical	  data	  analyses.	  Indeed,	  if	  this	  approach	  does	  prove	  to	  be	  useful,	  we	  may	  question	  whether	   it	   is	   based	   on	   mere	   analogy,	   or	   possibly,	   the	   far	   deeper	   connection	   between	  thermodynamics	  and	  inference	  championed	  by	  Jaynes	  and	  many	  others.	  	  
METHODS AND RESULTS  
We develop the central argument of this paper in three steps, as follows. We begin by postulating 
that a statistical model can be described by an equation (called an equation of state, or EqS), 
expressed in the form of the EqS for an ideal gas, and that this EqS defines a system that is 
governed by analogues of the 1st and 2nd Laws of Thermodynamics. In section (1) below, we 
reparameterize a simple binomial model to illustrate.  This establishes that it is possible to 
represent a statistical system in thermodynamic terms. We then (2) demonstrate that the quantity 
corresponding to temperature in this system, which we call E (for evidence), exhibits behavior 
that coincides in multiple respects with our intuitive feel for the behavior of statistical evidence. 
This establishes that it is plausible to use such a system to define statistical evidence.  Finally, 
(3) we explicitly address the meaning of means the same thing for the unit of measurement for E. 
We show how this formalism leads us to think about statistical systems in fundamentally new 
ways, and we posit that doing so will prove useful, just as early thermodynamic investigations 
led to new and productive ways of thinking about heat. Throughout we attempt to motivate the 
analogy between specific thermodynamic quantities and their evidential counterparts 
heuristically; in Appendix A we present an alternative derivation of fundamentals of the new 
framework, which is mathematically more direct but also more abstract.    
(1) Possibility of the Formalism We start with a simple binomial coin tossing model, with x 
heads out of n tosses, and probability θ that the coin lands heads. We consider the hypothesis 
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contrast “coin is biased” versus “coin is not biased” (θ=0.5).1 We stipulate that the LR (Eq. 1, 
Table 1), captures all the evidential content of the system, insofar as the addition of anything 
beyond the LR would not change the evidence conveyed by given data with respect to the stated 
hypotheses. This stipulation is fundamental to our framework; for related discussion see 
(Hacking 1965; Edwards 1992; Royall 1997). While we generally think of changes in the LR 
graph as resulting from changes in the data (n, x), we can equally well consider the permissible 
transformations of the graph per se, where what is permissible is any state of the system that 
conforms to the underlying binomial LR equation as the data change. In section (2) below, we 
treat both n and x as continuous (non-negative) numbers, for reasons that will become clear in 
section (3).  
We begin with the postulate that the EqS for this system can be described by the equation 
describing an ideal gas (Eq. 2, Table 1). Our task, therefore, is to see if we can find a 
reparameterization of the statistical system that enables us to express it in the form PV=RT. This 
involves deriving the analogues of the constituent quantities and demonstrating internal 
consistency for the resulting EqS in statistical terms. (Here we omit the usual factor N = number 
of moles of matter, or equivalently, we use as our template the EqS for a single mole of matter; 
see the Discussion for further comments.) 
As the evidential analogue of volume, VE, we simply use the area under the LR curve (Eq. 3, 
Table 1). (In a two-parameter model, this would be an actual volume.) Here we consider a one-
sided case, in which the quantity in Eq. 3 is integrated from θ=0 to 0.5 (with x ≤ n/2). While this 
complicates the arithmetic somewhat, it will simplify some aspects of the presentation. The one-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The form of this contrast is fundamental to the formalism and relates to the role of information entropy in the 
system; see below. 	  
Theory Biosci. (2013) 132:181–194 
	  
	   8	  
sided case also plays a special role in statistical genetics, and we have investigated its properties 
in detail elsewhere (Hodge and Vieland 2010). We have established previously that at least in 
statistical genetic applications, VE exhibits "thermoscopic" behavior, in the sense that it properly 
goes up (or down) as the evidence goes up (or down), and in a manner unmatched by other 
standard approaches to quantifying evidence, such as the p-value or the maximum LR (Huang 
and Vieland 2001; Bartlett and Vieland 2006; Huang and Vieland 2010). Thus we view VE as a 
direct analogue of physical volume V in elementary thermodynamic systems, in that like V, VE 
can serve as a thermoscopic indicator of increasing or decreasing temperature.2 
In thermodynamics, if we impose the 1st Law (conservation of energy) and 2nd Law 
(impossibility of a perpetual motion machine) on an ideal gas, then we can also express the EqS 
in terms of the entropy S (Fermi 1956 (orig. 1936)) (Eq. 4 in our Table 1), where S is defined up 
to an (additive) constant. In physics, CV can take on one of three values: 1.5R, 2.5R, 3R, for 
monatomic, diatomic, and polyatomic gasses respectively. Here we fix CV=1.5R throughout. See 
the Discussion and Appendix A for further comments on the evidential analogues of the 1st and 
2nd Laws; see also Palacios (quoted in (Krantz, Luce et al. 1971, p. 456)) for discussion of the 
thermodynamic constants. 
From Jaynes (Jaynes 1957) and Kullback (Kullback 1968) we have a direct connection 
between the thermodynamic quantity S and the Shannon information, and between the Shannon 
information and statistical information (Fisher information, etc.). We therefore deploy a 
definition of S based on Shannon. This will be the “hook” that enables us to connect the binomial 
LR to a thermodynamic representation of the system. Specifically, we define the evidential 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  In previous work we have referred to a quantity closely related to VE as the Bayes Ratio (BR, see e.g. Vieland et 
al. (2011)). The BR differs from VE insofar as it multiplies the LR by a prior distribution, generally taken to be 
uniform. Note that VE also differs from the Bayes Factor in general contexts, insofar as the integral of VE is taken 
over the LR as a whole. In the present case, however, this distinction is moot as the denominator is not a function of 
θ. 	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analogue of S, which we denote SE, as a particular form of relative entropy, viz., the information 
entropy evaluated at the constrained maximum entropy (MaxEnt) value of the binomial 
probability θ, which is in this case simply the maximum likelihood estimator x/n, relative to the 
information entropy evaluated at the unconstrained MaxEnt value θ = ½ (Eq. 5, Table 1). As in 
physics, SE is defined only up to an additive constant. See also (Krantz, Luce et al. 1971) for an 
axiomatic basis for entropy as a mathematical rather than physical quantity. We note that the 
property of reversibility is a consequence of this definition: SE depends only on the current state 
of the system, regardless of the path taken on a PEVE diagram (see below) to arrive at that state 
from some other state; and because we have defined it in terms of MaxEnt states, assuming that 
MaxEnt also corresponds to statistical equilibrium, the evidential system developed here can be 
said to be in an equilibrium state at all times.  
We can now derive the remaining variables needed to completely describe the system. 
Substituting SE and VE into Eq. 4 and exponentiating, we obtain an evidential analogue of T, 
which we call E (Eq. 6, Table 1). Note that E in Eq. 6 is always non-negative. (Because SE is 
defined with respect to the MaxEnt state, we expect this definition of E to relate directly to the 
parameter β of the Boltzmann distribution.) Finally, substituting E as expressed in Eq. 6 into 
Eq.2 (Table 1), we obtain the evidential analogue of the pressure P, PE (Eq. 7, Table 1).  
Thus we have successfully reparameterized the initial binomial system, expressed in terms of 
(LR, n, x), into an explicit EqS describing the LR graph in terms of (VE, PE, E), while tacitly 
imposing analogues of the 1st and 2nd Laws of Thermodynamics. We can now describe allowable 
transformations of the system in terms of any change in the LR graph that conforms to the 
underlying binomial EqS, without explicitly referencing changes in data. This shift from the 
usual statistical perspective is critical, because it allows us to view changes in the LR graph in 
Theory Biosci. (2013) 132:181–194 
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terms of the in- or out-flux of evidential information, rather than in terms of changes in data (see 
section 3 below). The only remaining unknown in this system is the constant R. For the present, 
we set R = 1 (again, see (Krantz, Luce et al. 1971)). 
(2) Plausibility of the Formalism In this section we look at features of the system to see how 
they relate to what we would ordinarily mean by statistical evidence. As just noted, a crucial 
aspect of this formalism is that we can consider transformations of the system directly in terms of 
changes in the LR graph, rather than in terms of changes in the data. However, in order to 
establish the plausibility of the system, it is desirable to be able to appeal to statistical intuition, 
and this requires considering the behavior of the graph in familiar terms, as a function of (n, x). 
Thus while we continue to assume that we are working with the EqS for (on the physical side) a 
single mole of matter, or what is probably best viewed as a fixed quantity of data, we will plot 
results as a function of changes in n. The rationale lies in the transitional nature of this section, 
illustrating properties of the system in familiar statistical terms, en route to thinking of changes 
as influenced not by the influx of data, but rather, by the influx of evidential information (again, 
see section 3).  
A feature of this system that plays an important role in subsequent discussion is that it 
captures evidence either in favor of the numerator of the LR or in favor of the denominator.3 
However, there is no particular “mark” designating which is which, that is, no fixed value below 
which the evidence always favors the denominator. On the other hand, for given n, there exists a 
value of x at which E is minimized (Figure 1(a)). We call this (n, x) pair, which depends on E, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  We have argued elsewhere that this is a critically important feature of any evidence metric (see e.g. Vieland 
(2006)). 	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the TRansition Point (TrP(E)).4 To the left of TrP(E) the evidence favors "coin is biased," and to 
the right of TrP(E) the evidence favors "coin is not biased."  
The behavior shown in Figure 1(a) makes sense from a statistical point of view. Bearing in 
mind whether one is looking to the left or right of TrP(E), this behavior conforms to what we 
mean by evidence in terms of two basic properties: (i) for fixed x/n, as n increases E increases; 
(ii) for fixed n and reading from left to right on the x/n axis, E decreases up to TrP(E), then 
increases. Figure 1(b) shows x/n at TrP(E) over a broader range of n. This plot also illustrates 
sensible behavior: as n increases, TrP(E) moves towards x = n/2; i.e., for very large n, even a 
small deviation from x = n/2 constitutes evidence against θ = 0.5.5 One thing that may trouble 
statisticians is the increase in E at TrP(E) as a function of n. We return to this point in the 
Discussion. Figure 1(c) shows a view of E as a function of (n, x) in three-dimensional space for n 
up to 1000, again showing consistent statistical behavior. We note also that as Figures 1(a) and 
1(c) illustrate, for given n, it is possible to have far stronger evidence in favor of “coin is biased” 
than in favor of “coin is not biased.” This reflects the fundamental asymmetry in the hypotheses, 
with the denominator specifying a single value (θ=½), and the numerator allowing for any value 
θ < ½.   
In aggregate, the behavior illustrated in Figure 1 speaks to the plausibility of the current 
model as a representation of a statistical system. Moreover, with the model in hand, we can now 
begin to think of the system in ways that are unfamiliar to statisticians.  For instance, the 
contours of Figure 1(c) describe what could be called the “isotherms” of the system, that is, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  TrP(E)	  is	  obtained	  by	  solving	  the	  following	  equation	  for	  x:	   θ x (1 − θ ) n− x log θ1 − θ( ) dθ0.5∫
θ
x
(1 − θ )
n− x
dθ
0
.5
∫
= log
x
n − x
.	  
5	  If we were considering values of x > n/2, we would also need to distinguish a corresponding set of mirrored sectors 
on that side of n/2. This is one reason it is simpler to restrict attention to the one-sided case, in which we need only 
consider two sectors of the graphs.	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set of (n, x) values corresponding to a single value of E (Figure 2(a); Figure 2(b) shows these 
same isotherms plotted against x/n). These isotherms also behave in accordance with our 
intuitions regarding evidence. E.g., consider (n = 10,  x = 0) (not shown on Figure). Whatever the 
value of the evidence for that point, we know that as n increases while holding x fixed, the 
evidence must go up. This implies that, were we to hold the evidence fixed and increase n, x 
would have to increase in order to compensate. Conversely, if we hold n fixed and increase x, the 
evidence will diminish, which implies that if we were to hold the evidence constant while 
increasing x, n would have to go up to compensate. We do not normally think of the dynamics of 
statistical systems in these terms, precisely because outside of this framework, we have no way 
to hold the evidence constant in our mind's eye while allowing the LR graph to change. Given a 
way to establish these isotherms, however, the behavior illustrated in Figure 2(b) clearly makes 
statistical sense. Note also that the maximum value of n for each isotherm occurs at TrP(E). 
Figure 2(c) shows one isotherm plotted as a function of VE and PE, illustrating consistency 
between the behavior of E and a physical system.  
 Finally, we consider another quantity unfamiliar in traditional statistical frameworks, namely, 
the evidential equivalent of physical (mechanical) work. We are interested in the effects of in- or 
out-flux of evidential information on the LR graph, characterized in terms of the fundamental 
features of the graph. We posit, therefore, that the quantity PEdVE correctly characterizes a 
transformation of the system from an information-transfer point of view, just as PdV does in 
physics from an energy-transfer point of view (Fermi 1956 (orig. 1936)). Thus the amount of 
evidential work done during a given transformation of the system from state A to state B is the 
quantity WE (Eq. 8, Table 1). While we are not aware of a familiar statistical analogue of this 
notion of evidential work, nevertheless, we think that work defined in this way has some 
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intuitively appealing features. In particular, a given change in VE is more difficult to effect 
(requires greater information influx, see below) for higher E. As in physics, we distinguish work 
being done by the system (WE) from work done to the system (-WE). The central importance of 
this notion of evidential work will become clear in the following section. See also Appendix A, 
which makes clear that nothing in the underlying mathematics requires an interpretation in terms 
of mechanical work per se. 
Note that, because our evidential system follows the ideal gas EqS by design, it follows 
immediately that the system exhibits the characteristic properties of ideal gases, including 
Boyle’s Law (for fixed E, PE and VE are inversely proportional), Charles’ Law (for fixed PE, VE 
is proportional to E), etc. 
(3) Utility of the Formalism We have thus far established that it is possible and plausible to 
view a statistical system in thermodynamic terms, with the evidential analogue of T, our quantity 
E, serving as a measure of statistical evidence. It remains to illustrate why we believe this new 
framework will prove useful. Here we show the utility of the framework for establishing an 
absolute scale for the measurement of E and a context in which we can explicitly give the 
meaning of means the same thing for one degree on this scale. 
Following Kelvin, we make use of the Carnot engine, an abstract mathematical device for 
considering the relationship between physical heat and work.6 As we now know, although Carnot 
himself did not, a heat engine works by converting one form of energy to another; specifically, 
by converting heat input into mechanical work. The Carnot engine can be pictured as a cylinder 
containing a fixed quantity of gas, with a movable (frictionless) piston constraining the volume, 
and with two (infinite) heat reservoirs available for contact with the cylinder, one at temperature 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	   Throughout	   this	   section	   we	   draw	   heavily	   on	   Fermi	   (1956),	   where	   the	   equations	   for	   adiabatic	  transformations	  used	  in	  the	  evidential	  Carnot	  cycles	  can	  also	  be	  found.	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t2 and the other at t 1 < t 2. Here we use lower case t to indicate that the temperature need not be 
measured on the absolute scale; any thermoscopic measure will suffice, even one for which the 
size of the unit changes across different parts of the temperature range. Each cycle of the Carnot 
engine is decomposed into four distinct strokes, A-D, as follows: (A) Heat is absorbed by the 
system from the warmer heat reservoir while maintaining constant temperature t2, with 
corresponding increase in V and decrease in P, for an isothermal change. (B) Heat transfer is 
stopped (the reservoir is removed from contact) and the system is allowed to continue to expand 
and cool down to temperature t1, through a process known as adiabatic change. (C) The system is 
compressed isothermally by application of external force (work) at constant t1, with 
corresponding reduction in V and increase in P, requiring a corresponding transfer of energy out 
of the system into the cooler heat reservoir. (D) The system is permitted to continue 
adiabatically, with no further transfer of energy (no further contact with the second reservoir), 
until it returns to its initial state. During the first two strokes work is done by the system (positive 
work), while during the second two strokes work is done to the system (negative work). A 
mechanical heat engine is effective insofar as more work is done by the system during the first 
two strokes than is required to be done to the system through external means during the third 
stroke in order to return it to its initial state, and this happens because less work is required to 
effect the same transformation (or its reverse) at lower temperatures.  
We too can run evidential Carnot cycles using our binomial system.7 Figure 3 shows two 
numerical examples of such cycles on a classical PV (more specifically, PEVE) diagram. These 
cycles are readily seen to correspond to genuine Carnot cycles: in each cycle, work done during 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  The Carnot cycle requires reversibility of all processes, that is, it is an idealized system which never departs from 
equilibrium. This property does not hold for any actual physical system. Our evidential system appears to be 
inherently reversible, at least insofar as it is always (instantaneously) in its MaxEnt state. 	  
Theory Biosci. (2013) 132:181–194 
	  
	   15	  
the two adiabatic strokes (WB, -WD) is identical in magnitude but opposite in sign; work WA 
done in the first (isothermal) stroke is greater in magnitude than the work –WC done in the third 
(isothermal) stroke; and WC/WA = e1/e2, where e is the analog of t in the physical engine, that is, 
any "thermoscopic" measure of evidence. We now posit that evidential work is a transformation 
of evidential information, just as mechanical work is a transformation of heat in a physical heat 
engine. In physics, heat Q represents the quantity of energy transferred in or out of the system. 
Following this convention, we consider evidential energy, QE, to be the amount of evidential 
information being transferred. In what follows we use Q2 to indicate the evidential energy 
transferred into the engine during the first stroke at e2, and Q1 to denote the evidential energy 
transferred out of the engine during the third stroke at e1. 
For a cyclic, reversible transformation, there is no net change in energy from the initial to 
final state of the system, since by stipulation the system is returned to its initial state. In this case 
and for an ideal gas, W is a direct measure of heat, and in particular, WA = Q2.  Thus defining the 
efficiency η of the engine as the ratio of the work performed by the cycle to the evidential 
information absorbed at the higher evidence level (and temporarily omitting subscript "E"s for 
notational convenience), we have η = (WA+WB-WC-WD)/WA = (WA-WC)/WA = 1-WC/WA = 1-
Q1/Q2. Carnot proved that reversible cyclic engines have maximal efficiency, and by direct 
application of his reasoning we also have the result that all such evidential engines operating 
between the evidence levels e1, e2 share the same ratio Q1/Q2. In other words, the ratio of 
evidential energies depends only on the ratio of evidence levels, and on nothing else specific to 
the particular system. Thus we can write Q1/Q2 = f(e1, e2), where (paraphrasing Fermi) f is a 
universal function of the two evidence levels. From here we can directly follow the arithmetic in 
Fermi to show that f(e1, e2) = f(e0, e1)/ f(e0, e2), for e0 any arbitrary level of evidence. Fixing e0 at 
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a constant value we can therefore consider f(e0, e) to be a function of e only, thus, K f(e0, e) = 
g(e), where K is an arbitrary constant. This gives, finally, Q1/Q2 = g(e1)/g(e2).  
If we now consider g(e) to be the evidence E, we see that we have converted our 
"thermoscopic" measure e onto an absolute scale in the following sense: first, it is immediately 
apparent that E is on a ratio scale (Hand 2004), hence has an absolute 0; second, while the 
functional form of g remains to be set, meaning that the size of the degree is not yet specified, a 
given change in evidential energy will always correspond to the same amount of change in E. 
This result is entirely independent of the particulars of the engine, and will hold for any 
reversible cyclic operation.8 Figure 3 illustrates the meaning of "means the same thing" in the 
context of reversible cyclic transformations. As shown, a two-fold change in E corresponds to an 
identical ratio of evidential work, and thus also an identical ratio of evidential information, 
across the measurement scale.  
As in physics, we did not define QE up front.  However, we have now arrived at an 
understanding of what QE must be, namely, the transfer of evidential information in a form that 
can be converted to WE. Moreover, we immediately have a ready mechanism for measuring the 
amount of evidential information through the heat-work (energy-work) relationship in an 
evidential Carnot cycle. In principle then, we can use any "thermoscopic" measure of statistical 
evidence, such as VE itself (at least for simple systems such as the one-sided binomial), as an 
evidence measure, and calibrate it against this absolute scale. Of course, different functions g 
must be derived for each different type of statistical outcome measure in order to accomplish 
this; and beyond the context of the highly stylized Carnot cycle, myriad practical issues 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  In particular, for an ideal gas, WC/WA is independent of the heat capacity constant CV in Eq 4 (Table 1). This is one 
reason we have not worried about the value of CV in the preceding development of the theory. See also Hand's 
(2004) discussion (pages 65-67) of Luce's principles and Krantz et al. (2007) for some relevant measure-theoretic 
principles.	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complicate actual measurement calibration. Additionally, the statistical outcome measure must 
itself behave thermoscopically, properly tracking up and down with the evidence.  
Thus we have not so much solved the evidence measurement problem, as reformulated it in a 
way that makes it amenable to solution for the first time. Any remaining skepticism regarding the 
probability of success in practical applications may be offset by an appreciation of how difficult 
the corresponding practical problems were in physics (Chang 2004). It is all the more heartening, 
therefore, that we can now take the ordinary drugstore thermometer wholly for granted. 
 
DISCUSSION 
We can now restate the central problem we set out to address.  We imagine that a given set of 
data has internal energy, UE. UE can be thought of as a form of information if that seems more 
comfortable, but to begin with we did not define UE, nor did we propose any particular device for 
directly measuring it. (This too parallels the development of thermodynamics (Callen 1985) (p. 
461).) We posit only that it is the transfer of evidential energy in or out of a statistical system that 
causes changes in the LR graph. Having characterized those changes as above, we can now refer 
to this as the process of an influx (or outflux) of evidential heat QE doing evidential work WE. 
Our task then is to measure that property of UE that corresponds to what we mean by statistical 
evidence, which we have done by drawing directly on thermodynamic results to show how to 
measure E, the evidential analogue of T, on what is demonstrably an absolute scale in the same 
sense in which the Kelvin scale is an absolute scale for temperature. As in thermodynamics 
(Chang 2004), we first derived the measurement scale, and only then were we in a position to 
consider what precisely it is that E is measuring.  
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Under this new formalism, E is a measure of evidential information, or what we might now 
preferably call evidential energy, with the unit of E having fixed meaning as described above. 
This opens an entirely new line of research into the manner in which evidential energy is 
transformed into evidential work as data accumulate, including investigation of relative 
efficiencies of different mechanisms (statistical models) for so doing. We speculate that this shift 
in perspective will have numerous ancillary benefits, allowing us to extend Jaynes’ program of 
connecting the laws of inference with the laws governing physical systems through the shared 
concept of information, or evidential energy. (Note,	  however,	  that	  our	  framework	  is	  silent	  on	  some	   matters	   of	   central	   concern	   to	   Jaynes	   and	   other	   Bayesians,	   such	   as	   the	   proper	  formulation	  of	  priors	  or	  rational	  procedures	  for	  rank-­‐ordering	  beliefs.) First and foremost, 
however, we envision this paper as merely a prelude to the difficult empirical work of aligning 
evidence measures across applications in biomedical research, so that results can be properly 
interpreted across the measurement scale within any one application, across disparate 
applications, and across different types and levels of analysis.	  
While it may seem odd, although we have derived an absolute scale for evidence 
measurement we have in fact not yet specified the units of that scale. In thermodynamics too, the 
size of the degree is an arbitrary choice, set by convention. Thus we can say that E, as it occurs 
in all Figures in this paper, is on the absolute scale; yet at the same time, the numerical values of 
E shown here may not correspond to what we will eventually settle upon as the actual values of 
the evidence, once a decision has been made regarding the size of the standard measurement 
unit.9  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  One	  interesting	  departure	  from	  physical	  systems,	  at	  least	  for	  simple	  evidential	  systems	  such	  as	  the	  binomial,	  is	  the	  apparent	   lack	  of	  a	  need	  for	  dimensional	  analysis.	  We	  speculate	  that	  this	  relates	  to	  the	  fact	  that,	  apart	  from	   the	   evidence	   itself,	   the	   remaining	   underlying	   evidential	   quantities	   are	   all	   themselves	   immediately	   on	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One important consequence of our results is the necessity to reconsider the role of n in 
statistical systems. Initially, we had supposed that the accumulation of evidence based on two 
sets of data, with n1 = n2 observations respectively, would be the analogue of doubling the 
number of particles (or moles of matter) in the system. However, the new framework invites us 
to view n (more precisely, the pair (n, x)) as an index of evidential energy, not of the number of 
particles. Once we see that E measures energy UE and that in the context of an evidential Carnot 
cycle this energy can be directly measured through the work WE, it becomes clear that n as it 
appears in our equations must relate to the units of energy, not matter: (n, x) is what changes as 
energy flows in and out of the system, and it is changes in (n, x) that correspond to evidential 
work. This is built into the thermodynamic equations that form the basis of the system.  In 
thermodynamics too, it is possible to effect equivalent changes in macroscopic properties of a 
system (such as V, P) by either the input of energy or the input of particles (under suitable 
conditions for each). Indeed, our own previous work on evidential "thermoscopes" has 
highlighted the distinction between "pooling" data (considering all data as a single data set) and 
"sequentially updating" the evidence across data sets (Vieland 2006; Hodge and Vieland 2010; 
Vieland, Huang et al. 2011). In hindsight this appears to relate to the distinction between viewing 
changes in the system as resulting from changes in n considered as the number of observations 
("pooling") or as changes in n considered as an index of energy (sequentially updating results 
without combining data). Virtually all asymptotic theory in statistical inference is based on 
pooling as the fundamental operation as n increases, but we have argued elsewhere (Vieland and 
Hodge 2011) that a cogent measure-theoretic approach to the concatenation of evidence across 
data sets may require some form of updating. This remains a topic for further research. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  numerical	   scales,	   that	   is,	   they	   are	   not	  measurements	   of	   anything	   in	   the	   usual	   sense.	  Hence	   their	   units	   are	  implicit	  and	  need	  not	  be	  further	  specified.	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We also view it as likely that future work will need to carefully consider the units of n itself. 
E.g., in human genetics, the unit of observation may be a pair of individuals (e.g., an affected 
sibling-pair) or an arbitrarily large family, which might correspond to gases of different atomic 
structures. Another tantalizing connection relates to the characterization of energy in our system 
by the (n, x) pair, with x being bounded by n. Possibly even a simple statistical system would be 
more appropriately modeled through the Van der Waals EqS (Fermi 1956 (orig. 1936)), which 
incorporates particle size and particle interaction, with the strength of the latter being constrained 
by the former. While merely a metaphor at this point, the Van der Waals equation has the further 
advantage that it allows for  phase transitions, in a way that Eq. 2 itself does not. It could be that 
the two sides of TrP(E) are best thought of as different “phases,” like liquid and gaseous states. 
This might also relate to the behavior of E as an increasing function of n at TrP(E), which  is a 
direct consequence of the definition of E (Eq. 6) as a function of SE. Possibly in further 
elaborations of the model, TrP(E) will prove to be a phase transition boundary point, at which E 
remains constant regardless of energy input into the system. See also Appendix B, in which we 
derive a relationship between E and the observed Fisher Information. This relationship is 
interesting in its own right; moreover, we believe that further consideration may yield insights 
into the behavior of E at TrP(E). 
One further aspect of our system that may strike both statisticians and physicists as 
implausible is the assumption of evidential analogues of the 1st and 2nd Laws of 
Thermodynamics, which are generally thought of as essentially physical in nature. In Appendix 
A we formally define the evidential 1st Law and take preliminary steps towards an evidential 2nd 
Law. (See(Vieland 2013) for a more complete treatment of this topic.) As in thermodynamics, 
these laws cannot be proved, but will be vindicated insofar as they allow us to usefully describe 
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and manipulate statistical systems (Van Ness 1983; Callen 1985). Given the coherence of the 
new evidential framework so far, derived under the methodological assumption of an intimate 
relationship to the equations of thermodynamics, we believe that further investigation will 
confirm deep axiomatic connections between statistical systems characterized in terms of 
evidential information or energy, and the basic laws of thermodynamics.  
Theoretical matters aside, the ultimate intent of this project is to be useful in practice. 
Measurement is not, after all, an end in itself, but rather a sine qua non of rigorous scientific 
activity. When completed, our formalism would not replace other statistical investigations, but it 
would ideally provide a basis for reporting results of statistical analyses on a unified scale for 
purposes of meaningful comparison across the range of the measurement scale and across 
disparate applications. Considerable hard work remains to be done, however, before this 
framework can be usefully applied to real data analyses. To begin with, we have considered only 
a simple, discrete distribution. (Discrete distributions may play a special role in evidential 
systems, just as they do in physical systems.) We will need to establish the validity of 
corresponding treatments of more complex statistical models involving nuisance parameters, 
approximating likelihoods, and disparate data structures, along with two-sided LR contrasts, 
before the framework can be deployed in target areas such as biomedical research. Finally, as a 
practical matter, we will need ways to indicate whether a given value of E is to the left, directly 
at, or to the right of TrP(E). This information is readily recovered from the underlying 
calculations, but forms a kind of meta-data that would need to be associated with the value of E 
in applications. Again, this might be equivalent to wanting to know whether a substance is in its 
liquid or gaseous state, which depends not just on temperature, but also on the volume and 
pressure of the system. 
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The practical challenges to deploying the new framework are substantial, but no more so than 
the challenges physicists faced in making practical use of the Kelvin thermal scale itself (Chang 
2004). Just as we have exploited the well-established foundations of thermodynamics to develop 
the new evidential model, we believe that we can look to the experiences of experimental physics 
to facilitate translation of the theory into practice. Here too we may enjoy the benefits of 
standing on the shoulders of giants. 
	  
Appendix A: Evidential versions of the 1st and 2nd Laws of Thermodynamics 
(Material in this Appendix draws on(Vieland 2013).) Consider the LR graph describing a set 
of data. In any reasonable statistical treatment, this graph changes only if we alter the data; 
otherwise we are working with something other than the LR under its usual definition. In 
particular, the consideration of new data will in general result in a transformation of the LR 
graph from its initial state (for initial data) to some new state (for the initial and new data 
considered together). Even prior to considering the nature or mechanism of that transformation, 
we can insist that it must appropriately reflect the effects of the new data and nothing but the 
effects of the new data.  As a statistical matter, this hardly seems worth stating as some kind of 
law, but it can be seen to be the analog of an important physical principle: 
Conservation Principle (physical): The variation in energy of a system during any 
transformation is equal to the amount of energy that the system receives from its 
environment.  
Fermi (1956, p. 11) gives this as an informal statement of the 1st Law of thermodynamics (1st 
Law).  
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He then says: "In order to give a precise meaning to this statement, it is necessary to define the 
phrases "energy of the system" and "energy that the system receives from its environment during 
a transformation." In this Appendix we articulate the corresponding definitions on the evidential 
side, in order to precisely state an evidential analogue of the 1st Law. We then comment briefly 
on implications of our work thus far regarding an evidential analogue of the 2nd Law.  
One very important point to note is the logical status of the 1st Law in physics: Its defense 
rests on (a) assuming that it is true and considering what this assumption implies; and (b) failing 
to find counterexamples to these implications in experiments. Just so, here we assume the 
applicability of an analogous Conservation Principle in the form suggested by Fermi, and attempt 
to articulate it as rigorously as possible. Ultimately the rationale for assuming that this principle 
applies to evidential systems will inhere in its utility.  
(1) Preliminaries We have a data set D1 and the graph of the LR corresponding to D1 (and the 
hypotheses of interest), which we'll denote LR(A). LR(A) represents the "system" in its initial 
state. We are concerned with the effects on this system of a second data set, D2. Let's designate 
the final state of the system, after consideration of D2, as LR(B). Note that at this point we have 
not said anything specific about how we get from LR(A) to LR(B). For expository reasons, let's 
assume we're working with binomial data (n,x) and the (one-sided) binomial likelihood ratio as 
described in the main text. 
We want to characterize the change in the LR graph from LR(A) to LR(B), or ΔLR, in terms 
of change in evidence. Prior to defining evidence formally, we note that evidence measures a 
property of some key feature of the system. Let's denote this feature by UE. The single most 
important feature of UE to note for the moment is that it must be a state variable associated with 
the LR graph. That is, for any given set of data (n, x), UE depends only on the data used to draw 
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the LR graph, and not, for example, on anything related to the history of data collection.  
Otherwise, the evidence would depend upon things other than the LR graph, which by stipulation 
is precluded (see p. 6 above).  As with its physical counterpart internal energy U, UE is defined 
only up to an additive constant, determined by arbitrarily selecting some standard state UE(0) 
against which other states are measured. (See Fermi (1956, p. 12-14) which refers to the 
indeterminate constant as "an essential feature of the concept of energy," so that only differences 
in energy are meaningfully quantifiable. This property is also essential to the log likelihood, 
which is closely related to the expected Shannon information, further supporting our proposal 
that (physical) energy and (evidential) information are mathematical counterparts of one 
another.)  
We now seek to formally characterize the change in UE from state A to state B, or ΔUE, 
corresponding to ΔLR. We know that the binomial LR graph for given n, x can be uniquely 
specified in terms of two quantities, but there is leeway regarding which two we choose. 
Ordinarily, we simply use the underlying (n, x) pair itself. But here we are looking for a more 
general theory, one that will allow us to measure E when the data do not take binomial form, so 
we want to work in terms of characteristics of the graph itself.  Still, we have our choice of pairs 
of quantities we can use for this, e.g.: the area under the LR curve (let's call this VE) and the 
maximum height; VE and the maximizing value of x/n; the maximizing x/n and curvature of the 
graph around its maximum; etc..  Any two of these uniquely specifies the corresponding graph 
for given n and x. Since at some level it does not matter which two quantities we pick, we elect 
to use VE and an as yet unspecified second quantity, which we'll call PE. The only requirement 
for PE at this point is that (VE, PE) together need to uniquely determine an admissible state of the 
LR graph, that is, the binomial LR for given (n, x). (Other forms of the likelihood may require 
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different numbers of variables for unique specification of the LR graph.  The circumstances 
under which this is the case, and the additional quantities required in these cases, will be a matter 
of practical importance and a subject of future investigation. But nothing fundamental to the 
concepts developed in the remainder of this document hinges on this point.) 
(2) Paths We illustrate the notion of evidential paths (or simply "paths") with a concrete 
example. We begin with D1 = (n, x) = (4, 0) and D2 = (2, 1).  Thus LR(A) corresponds to (4, 0) 
while LR(B) corresponds to (6, 1). We now consider the following two possibilities: the 5th toss 
= 1 and the 6th toss = 0; or the 5th toss = 0 and the 6th toss = 1. That is, the transformation from 
LR(A) to LR(B) could go through the intermediate states (5,1) or (5,0). We refer to these as 
Path1 and Path2 respectively. Figure 4 shows the corresponding LR graphs. As above, we can 
fully specify each LR graph in terms of our quantities VE and PE. Thus, using a particular choice 
of PE (here we apply Eq. 7, Table 1 in main text) we can also represent each of the two paths on 
a PEVE diagram, as shown in Figure 5. (A different choice of PE would change the numerical 
values of quantities computed below, but not the underlying principles.) 
(3) Work We now need a word for the effect of D2 on the LR graph in terms of V and P. Let's 
call this effect "work" (-WE). (As in physics, the sign on WE is conventional, and here reflects 
the decision to describe the transformation produced by the new data as work done by the new 
data on the LR graph.) As Figure 5 illustrates, we need a measure of work that preserves the 
path-dependent nature of the transformation. In principle, we could consider either ΔWE=VEdPE 
or ΔWE=PEdVE; we choose to work with the latter, for reasons having to do with our choice of 
VE and its relationship to physical volume, e.g., in terms of thermoscopic properties. Thus for 
our transformation from state A to state B, we have −𝑊! = 𝑃!𝑑𝑉! .!!  
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To illustrate, we can calculate -WE for each of our paths (from the numerical example above) 
as the sum of the work done at each step on each of the two paths, respectively. This gives us      
-WE(Path1) = 1.79 and -WE(Path2) = 1.47. Thus the work associated with the transformation 
from (4, 0) to (6, 1) depends on the order of the 2 intervening tosses. Or as Fermi (1956, p. 15) 
puts it, "the work performed [in going from the initial to final states] depends on whether we go 
by means of the first way or by means of the second way."  
(4) Heat In the illustration above, since both paths begin and end with identical LR graphs, 
our state variable UE must change by the same amount in both cases. Our conservation principle 
instructs us that the change in the LR graph should reflect all and only the effects of D2, but if we 
rest with the notion that -WE captures all of the effects of D2, then we are left with the 
contradictory conclusion that D2's effects are both path-dependent and path-independent. There 
is only one way to reconcile these facts while adhering to the conservation principle, and that is 
to postulate the existence of an additional quantity. Let's call this additional quantity QE. While Q 
could simply stand for "quantity," because in thermodynamics it is called "heat," we refer to QE 
as heat as well.  
As long as we consider (physical) work as a fundamentally mechanical concept, it may be 
difficult to imagine a rationale for assuming an evidential, or purely mathematical, counterpart. 
In physics, it is convenient to illustrate the 1st Law by contrasting mechanical work with non-
mechanical forms of energy transfer, undoubtedly because mechanical work is so easily grasped 
and measured, while other concepts of energy, including heat itself, are strikingly abstract. 
However, from a formal point of view, what is essential to the Conservation Principle is not the 
equivalence between non-mechanical and mechanical forms of energy, but rather, the fact that in 
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the face of path-dependent energy transfer, we need to have (at least) two forms of energy 
available to us to fully describe the desired dynamics.  
(5) The First Law We can now formally articulate the conservation principle with which we 
started in precise notation, elevating it to the status of an evidential 1st Law: ΔUE = -WE + QE, or 
equivalently,  QE = ΔUE + WE. Note that we are able to express our Conservation Principle in 
this form in part because we've stipulated that QE is the sole "something else" upon which the 
relationship between UE and WE depends. Whether or not this assumption is warranted will be 
put to the test by experimentation down the road.  
One noteworthy feature of assuming the Evidential 1st Law is that it permits us to calculate 
the quantities ΔUE and QE, despite the utter abstractness of their definitions. Doing so, however, 
requires one further assumption, viz., specification of the mathematical relationships among PE, 
VE and evidence E. To illustrate we assume that this relationship adheres to the ideal gas EqS as 
in the main text (see also Appendix B). We can then calculate dUE = CVdE = -1.365, which must 
be the same for both paths since E is a state variable. Plugging this number into the evidential 1st 
Law we obtain QE(Path1) = -3.1550 and QE(Path2) = -2.8350.  
(6) The 2nd Law  In the main text we also defined a quantity SE (evidential entropy), and 
assumed dSE = δQE/E. The 2nd Law of Thermodynamics stipulates that in an isolated system, dS 
> 0 for "irreversible processes" and dS = 0 for reversible processes. It is readily confirmed that in 
the absence of energy influx, our evidential dS = 0. Recall too that all evidential transformations 
defined thus far are inherently reversible. It is unclear based on the above what the evidential 
analogue of irreversible processes would be, if any, and for this reason we postpone further 
formal development of an evidential 2nd Law. Nevertheless, we point out that some version of 
the 2nd Law is inevitable if the current formalism is to maintain coherence. In particular, it might 
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appear unclear on the face of it why evidential energy could not "flow" equally well from a 
system at higher E to one at lower E or vice versa. But the same reasoning that precludes this in 
thermodynamics applies here: if information could flow equally in either direction, we could 
build an evidential perpetual motion machine by linking evidential Carnot engines (Fermi 1956 
(orig. 1936)). Thus it must be the case that evidential energy "flows" only in one direction, and 
equivalently, that the only spontaneous changes in SE that can occur are increases.  See(Vieland 
2013) for further discussion. 
 
APPENDIX B: Relationship between E and Observed Fisher Information  We note first that 
when x/n is << 0.5, the LR in the region x/n > 0.5 becomes small, so that the area under the LR 
in that region is negligible. Therefore, we can approximate VE (Eq. 3 in Table 1) by integrating 
from 0 to 1 (rather than from 0 to 0.5), which simplifies the arithmetic. In this case we have  
  
VE ≈ LR(θ;n, x)dθ
0
1
∫ = 2nθ x (1−θ )n−x dθ
0
1
∫
= 2n B(x +1,n − x +1) = 2n x!(n − x)!(n +1)!
                                                                 (A1) 
where B is the beta function.  Additionally, we apply a form of Stirling's approximation 
(Zwillinger),  
 log(n!) ≈ n logn − n + log 2πn.                                                                        (A2) 
This gives 
 
VE ≈ 2n
x!(n − x)!
(n +1)!
≈ 2n x
x (n − x)n−x
(n +1)n+1
en+1
exen−x
2π x(n − x)
n +1
= 2n x
x (n − x)n−x
(n +1)n+1 e
2π x(n − x)
n +1 .
                                                                (A3) 
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Setting CV = ½R (rather than (3/2)R as used in the main text), and substituting the final 
expression in A3 into the expression for E (Eq. 6, Table 1), we obtain  
 
E = e
SE
V
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
2
≈
2n xn
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
x
1− xn
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
n−x
2n x
x (n − x)n−x
(n +1)n+1 e
2π x(n − x)
n +1
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
2
= n +1n
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
2n (n +1)3
e2 2π x(n − x)
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
.
                                (A4) 
Noting that  
 
lim
n→∞
n +1
n
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
n
= e                                                                                                    (A5) 
we see that as n goes to infinity, 
 
E→ (n +1)
3
2π x(n − x) = EAPPROX.                                                                         (A6) 
For the Binomial distribution, the Observed Fisher Information, evaluated at the maximizing 
value θ = x/n, is 
 
FIOBS =
n3
x(n − x) .          (A7) 
Thus in large samples, we have 
 
E ≈ 12π × FIOBS ,          (A8)
 
where the approximation improves as x/n approaches 0 and n goes to infinity.  Figure 6 
illustrates the relationship between E (Eq. 6 in Table 1), EAPPROX (from A6), and FIOBS/(2π) 
(from A7 and A8) for the model developed in the main text. Note that for fixed x/n, FIOBS is 
simply a constant times n. Thus E is approximately linear in n for small fixed values of x/n, or 
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equivalently, at low pressure PE. This accords with the common use of the simple ln LR as an 
evidence measure in the statistical literature, a quantity which is itself linear in n for fixed x/n.  
(However, E does not behave like the ln LR at higher PE, but rather adapts to the full dynamics 
of the system described in the main text.) This suggests the possibility of calibrating units of E 
against the ln LR in low fixed-pressure settings, much the way the size of the degree Kelvin was 
set by calibrating against the air thermometer. It is also noteworthy that E converges to 
FIOBS/(2π) under exactly those circumstances in which real gases behave like ideal gases: large n, 
or equivalently, high E (the counterpart of high temperature in physical systems), and small x/n, 
or equivalently, low PE (the counterpart of low pressure in physical systems).   
The approximation inherent in A1 itself improves as x/n becomes smaller and n becomes 
larger. Indeed, had we started from the outset with a two-sided hypothesis contrast (coin is fair 
vs. coin is not fair, without stipulating the direction of bias), the final expression in A1 would be 
exact rather than approximate, regardless of n. In this connection, what is most intriguing about 
Figure 6 is perhaps not where E and FIOBS coincide, but where they diverge: the relationship 
decays in the vicinity of the TrP(E), beyond which (reading left to right) E increases while FIOBS 
continues to decrease. Another way to express this is to say that E is taking explicit account of 
the particular hypothesis contrast (one-sided vs. two-sided) in a way that FI does not. We believe 
that this behavior can be related to phase transitions, following perhaps work such as 
(Prokopenko, Lizier et al.), which explicitly expresses statistical mechanical representations of 
thermodynamic systems in information theoretic terms. The connection between E and the 
observed Fisher Information - a relationship that we discovered only after development of E - 
also suggests a relationship between this work and (Frank), which posits the centrality of the 
Fisher Information itself to the dynamics of biological systems. 
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Table 1. Fundamental Equations  
 
 
Eq. # Equation Description 
Eq. 1 
LR = LR(θ | n, x) = θ
x (1−θ )n−x
12
n  
Binomial likelihood ratio, for n tosses, x heads, 
P(heads)=θ, where the denominator hypothesis is 
θ = ½ (no bias) 
Eq. 2 
PV = RT Ideal gas equation of state (EqS) for 1 mole, 
where P=pressure, V=volume, R is a positive 
(universal scaling) constant, and T= absolute 
temperature 
Eq. 3 VE = LR(θ ) dθ∫ = 2nθ x (1−θ )n−x dθ∫  Evidential Volume 
Eq. 4* 
S = CV logT + R logV  Alternative form of EqS together with 1st and 2nd 
Laws of Thermodynamics, where S=entropy and 
CV is a positive constant.  
Eq. 5 SE = n
x
n log
x
n
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ +
n − x
n log 1−
x
n
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ + log2
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
+ k  
Evidential Entropy, defined up to a constant k 
Eq. 6 E =
exp SE CV{ }
VE
RCV
 Evidence 
Eq. 7 PE =
RE
VE
= R
exp SE CV{ }
VE
RCV +1( )
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
⎟
⎟
 Evidential Pressure 
Eq. 8 WE = PE dVE
A
B
∫  Evidential Work 
 
 
* Note that Eq. 4, while a standard representation in thermodynamics texts, is not adequate for expressing the 
behavior of ideal gasses at very low temperatures, as T approaches its true minimum value of 0 [see Fermi 
(1956), p. 147]. Hence we avoid this part of the range throughout this paper. 
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Figure Legends 
 
Fig. 1 Behavior of binomial evidential system: (a) E as a function of x/n for various values of n; (b) x/n at 
TrP(E) as a function of n; (c) E as a function of (n, x). 
 
 
Fig. 2 (a) Various “isothermal” contours of the binomial evidential system as a function of (n, x); (b) These 
same isotherms plotted as a function of (n, x/n); (c) The E=2.25 isotherm on a PEVE diagram. Starting from the 
TrP: Moving to the left in panels (a) and (b) corresponds to moving to the right in  panel (c), and vice-versa, 
moving to the right in (a) and (b) corresponds to moving to the left in (c). 
 
 
Fig. 3 Two evidential Carnot cycles for the binomial system in the format of a classic PV diagram. Cycle 1 (on 
left) operates between E1=1 and E2=2; cycle 2 (on right) operates between E1=2 and E2=4. Both cycles start in 
the upper left and travel clockwise. For each stroke i (i=A,B,C,D; see text), work Wi is calculated as the area 
beneath the line connecting the nodes. For each cycle, the ratio WC/WA equals the ratio of evidence levels, or ½, 
as indicated visually by the right-hand panel for each cycle. This illustrates the general principle that for any 
cyclic transformation taking a system from evidence E to (½)E, the ratio of mechanical work performed at the 
two evidence levels is the same. 
 
Fig. 4 Four LR graphs corresponding to the initial and final states of the system, as well as the two intermediate 
states of the system corresponding to Path1 and Path2, respectively. Each path is labeled with its corresponding 
(n, x) pair. 
 
Fig. 5 PEVE plots corresponding to (a) Path1 and (b) Path2. The labels show the corresponding (n, x) pairs for 
the initial, intermediate and final states of the system, respectively. 
 
Fig. 6 E, EAPPROX, and FIOBS/(2π) for n = 10, 20, 50, and 100 (panels (a)-(d) respectively). The three quantities 
converge towards one another as n increases to the left of the TrP(E). Note that at x/n = 0, E has a finite value 
while both EAPPROX and FIOBS/(2π) become infinite. 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 3 
 
 
Figure 4 
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Figure 5 
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